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WADE H. McCREE, JR. t
I.
To accommodate the staggering increase in federal litigation
that has occurred in recent years, the federal judicial process has
been gradually, but significantly, transformed. The number of
federal judges has dramatically increased at both the trial and ap-
pellate levels.' The number of law clerks and "staff attorneys"
employed in the courts of appeals also has grown dramatically.2
Moreover, an increasing number of cases that are deemed lacking in
merit for one reason or another are now decided without oral argu-
ment,3 formal opinion, or even a terse statement of reasons.4 These
* This Article is based on the Owen J. Roberts Memorial Lecture, delivered
24 September 1980, under the auspices of the Pennsylvania Chapter of the Order
of the Coif, the Law Alumni Society, and the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
f Solicitor General of the United States. A.B. 1941, Fisk University; LL.B.
1944, Harvard University. I wish to acknowledge the assistance of Barry Sullivan
and George W. Jones, two of my Assistants who assisted in the draft of this paper
and reviewed it before publication.
IThe Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629,
increasing the number of authorized appellate judgeships from 97 to 132, was the
most recent step in this direction. The number of district court judgeships increased
from 399 in 1978 to 516 in 1979. AOmINISTRATI E OFFICE OF THE UNISED STATES
CouaTs, 1980 ANNuAL REPORT OF = DmEcTOR Table 3, at 3 [hereinafter cited as
REPORT OF = DIRECTOR]. See notes 25, 27 & 30 infra & accompanying text.
2 See text accompanying notes 48-65 infra. The Departments of State, Justice,
and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No, 91-153, 83 Stat. 403, 418-20, provided two law clerks for each
appellate judge. The Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary,
and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-68, 93 Stat. 416,
428, provided for a third clerk
For a history of the use of central staff attorneys, see D. MEADoR, AppIxTE
CoUrTs, STAFF AND PROCESS IN TE CmsIs oF VoLUME 12-18 (1974). See also
text accompanying notes 61-65 infra.
3 See notes 72 & 73 infra & accompanying text.
4 See text accompanying notes 72-74 infra.
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changes, which have been made in the hope of increasing judicial
productivity,5 have not been made without significant costs to the
quality of justice.6 My concern is that these costs have been too
high. In the language of the economists, the time has come to
carefully assess whether the marginal cost of generating one
more decision in a given period of time does not exceed the value
of that decision, both to society and to the parties immediately in-
volved in a dispute that requires reasoned resolution.
Much has been written about the elusive subjects of judging 7
and judicial administration.8 A substantial part of the entire pro-
duction is aptly summarized in two observations. The first comes
not from a lawyer, law professor or judge, but from H. L. Mencken,
a man not known for deference to received wisdom in the legal
profession or elsewhere. Mencken, it is said, once sent a letter of
congratulations to a friend who had recently become a judge. Lest
his friend be misled by his new-found stature in the world of
lawyers, Mencken tempered his congratulations with the warning
that his friend should remember that a judge is nothing but a law
student who grades his own papers. My second observation comes
from a more orthodox source-Justice Brandeis-who observed that
judges are respected "because we do our own work." 9
These two observations sum up what I take to be the tradi-
tional understanding of the judicial office: an office whose duties are
defined in terms of the actions, judgment and explanations not of
a committee, but of an individual. That the Founders of our Re-
public recognized this fact is evidenced by their efforts to guarantee
5 A substantial volume of literature has developed dealing with problems of
judicial efficiency and productivity. E.g., RI. GIr.E.ssm, JUDICIAL FRODUcTIv1TY
AND COURT DELAY: AN EXPLORATORY ANALYsis Or THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COTS
(1977); D. MEAmoR, supra note 2; Bell, Toward a More Efficient Federal Appeals
System, 54 JUDICATuRE 237 (1971); Flango & Blair, Creating an Intermediate
Appellate Court: Does It Reduce the Caseload of a State's Highest Court?, 64
JuDicATuRE 74 (1980); Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication
in the United States Courts of Appeals-The Price of Reforming, - U. CH. L.
Rlv. - (forthcoming).
6 See all of part HI infra. See also Carrington, Ceremony and Realism: Demise
of Appellate Procedure, 66 A.B.A.J. 860 (1980); Reynolds & Richman, supra
note 5.
7 Among the classic works are B. CAnDozo, THE NATRE or THE JUDICIAL
PROcEss (1921); J. FRANK, LAw AND Tm MoDmN Mn (1949); 0. HOLMES,
THE COMMON LAw (1881); K. LLEwELLYN, THE CoMMoN LAw TRADITO.N (1960).
8 See authorities cited in note 5 supra.
9 C. WYZANsiu, WaERAs: A JUDGE's PREmIss 61 (1965).
[Vol. 129:777
BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE
"judicial independence." 10 Life tenure " and fixed salaries 12 are
only two of the mechanisms I designed to ensure that judicial de-
cisions reflect the reasoned judgment of the persons we choose as
judges, rather than the temporary ascendancy of various political or
social forces.' 4 Similarly, the system ensures that the judge shall
be accountable. The judge must personally conduct the proceed-
ings in his court.15 He is generally expected to prepare an in-
dividually signed, publicly available opinion explaining the reasons
for his decision, 16 and the customary use of dissenting and concur-
ring opinions further focuses attention upon the actions of indi-
vidual judges.1
7
10 See Tim FEDERALIsT Nos. 78 & 79 (A. Hamilton) (Bourne ed. 1921);
DECLARATION OF hN1WENENCE ("He has made Judges dependent on His Will
alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.").
See generally H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEm 12-16 (1953); Ervin, Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence, 35 L.
& CONTEMP. PROB. 108 (1970). Cf. ABA CODE OF JUDICI. CoNDuCT Canon 1
("A Judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary.").
11 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour .... ").
12 Id. ("The Judges . . . shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.").
See generally United States v. Will, 100 S. Ct. 1010 (1980).
13 For example, judicial officers are afforded almost complete immunity from
liability for their official acts. See Stump v. Sparknan, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
14 See H. HART & A. SAcKs, THE LEAL PnocEss (tent. ed. 1958); Fiss, The
Supreme Court, 1978 Term: Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1,
6-17 (1979); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv.
L. REv. 1 (1959).
15 See Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91, 95 (1931) ("In a trial by
jury in a federal court, the judge is not a mere moderator, but is the governor of
the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct .... ."); Frankel, The
Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031, 1041-45 (1975);
Saltzburg, The Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the American Trial Judge, 64 VA.
L. REv. 1 (1978).
16 K. Li wEL.YN, supra note 7, at 35 ("those strange and beautiful institu-
tions, the signed opinion and the recorded vote, allow particular study of the
judges one by one .... ") (footnote omitted); Fuld, The Voices of Dissent, 62
CoLrie. L. REv. 923 (1962); Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92
HARv. L. REv. 353, 387-88 (1978); Leftar, Some Observations Concerning Judicial
Opinions, 61 Cozum. L. Rkv. 810 (1961); Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34
U. CH. L. REv. 3 (1966).
Constitutional provisions in a number of states require that the highest court
or all courts render written opinions stating the grounds for their decisions. E.g.,
Aiuz. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2; CAL. CoNsT. art. VI, § 14, cl. 2; MicIr. CoNsT.
art. 6, § 6; Mo. CoNsT. art. V, § 12; N.D. CONsT. art IV, § 89; ORE. CONST. art.
VII, § 4; UTAH CONST. art. 8, § 25; VA. CONST. art. 6, § 6; W. VA. CoNsT. art.
VI, §5.
17 Fuld, supra note 16; Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: Past and Present, 59
A.B.A.J. 361, 363 (1973); Stephens, The Function of Concurring and Dissenting
Opinions in Courts of Last Resort, 5 U. FLA. L. REv. 394 (1952).
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The judge is also unique among public officials because he has
no authority to set his own agenda. A judge must hear whatever
case is brought before him.' s We expect the judge, regardless of
how inconsequential a case might seem to be, to bring all his in-
tellectual power and judgment to bear on the issues before him,
with the expectation that he will reach the correct result for the
right reasons.19 The judge's profession is one, as Judge Friendly
has aptly remarked, whose "favorite word is 'why.' "20 The "bot-
tom line" is not unimportant, but it is not in itself the measure
of judicial performance. When we read a judicial opinion, we may
be swayed in some small measure by whether the writer shares our
views or prejudices and concludes with the words "AFFIRMED" as we
ourselves would.21 But it is what comes before-how the issues are
stated and how they are resolved-that leads us to conclude whether
this is a judge we are glad to have. Thus, we expect the judge,
like no other public official, to justify his decisions with reason.
Several commentators recently have described this aspect of the ju-
dicial process as a "dialogue." 22 This characterization well cap-
tures the personal tone of the business of judging. The notion of
dialogue-attentive listening, comprehension, and reasoned response
-embodies the standard we have set for judges.
It is because the quality of the judicial process necessarily de-
pends upon these qualities of the individual that we require federal
judges to be men and women in whom the appointing authority
reposes "special trust and confidence," as the Federal Commission
recites, because of their "wisdom, uprightness and learning." 23
18 J. GRAY, THE NATuRE AND SouRcEs OF THE LAw 114-15 (2d ed. 1921),
quoted in Fuller, supra note 16, at 385; Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness,
and the Consultative Process: An Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 HAnv. L. REv. 410
(1978); Fiss, supra note 14, at 13; Fuller, supra note 16, at 385-87.
19 Fiss, supra note 14, at 13-14; K. LLEwELLYN, supra note 7, at 387-88.
2
0H. FRIENDLY, BENCHmARKS 26 (1967).
21 Some might question whether reasoned analysis is as important for the lit-
igants as it is for the victor, but try explaining to a client why the court ruled
against him when the only judgment you have says nothing more than "affirned."
K. LLEwELLEN, supra note 7, at 26 ("[The] opinion is addressed also to the losing
party and counsel in an effort to make them feel at least that they have had a
fair break .. ").
2 2
R. BURT, TAmIrN CARE OF STRANGEns (1979); B. ACKERMAN, SocIAL
JUSTIcE n THE LmmiAL STATE (1980); Fiss, supra note 14, at 13-17; Remarks by
Bernard G. Segal, Annual Spring Meeting of the American College of Trial Lawyers
(Mar. 19, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Segal Remarks] ("It is important to remember
that while the law exists mostly on paper, it succeeds mostly in dialogue.").
23 The Federal Commission is the certificate each federal judge receives at the
time of his or her installation in office.
Provisions in a number of state constitutions reflect a similar attitude, re-
quiring, for example, that judges be "learned" or wise. E.g., A. A. CoNsT. art. VI,
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We should not, therefore, lightly disregard trends tending to "de-
personalize" the judicial function. Against this background, I
would like to examine briefly the changes that have recently been
made in the judicial process to accommodate the increase in the
federal caseload.
II.
Few would dispute that the caseload in the federal courts has
reached crisis proportions.24 A few statistics make the point clearly.
During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1940, there were fifty-seven
circuit judges and 3,446 appeals were filed. During the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1980, 4,225 appeals were filed in the Fifth Circuit
alone.26 The number of judges in the Fifth Circuit is somewhat
less than half the total number of circuit judges in 1940.27 The
Sixth Circuit, the court on which I sat, provides even more startling
evidence: forty-one percent of all the appeals that the Sixth Circuit
has heard since 1891 have been filed within the past decade.28 More
generally, during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1980, 23,200 ap-
peals were filed in the federal courts, 29 more than six times the
number filed in 1940. Each of the fifty-seven circuit court judges
of 1940 would have been personally responsible for about sixty
cases, if they were divided evenly. In 1980, each of the 132 judges
that we now have 30 would have been personally responsible for
about 175 cases. Those numbers understate the burden on indi-
vidual judges because they do not account for the important fact that
the courts of appeals sit in three-judge panels, requiring each of the
judges to prepare to consider each of the cases heard by the panel,
regardless of the ultimate writing assignment. 31 When one con-
§ 154 ("learned in the law"); Aim. CONST. art. VI, §§ 6, 16 (same); DEL. CONST.
art. IV, § 2 (same); MD. CONST. art. IV, § 2 ("integrity, wisdom and sound legal
knowledge"); MNN. CONST. art. VI, § 5.
24 See, e.g., NLRB v. Clothing Workers Local 990, 430 F.2d 966 (5th Cir.
1970); Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to
the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HAv. L. REv. 542 (1969);
Haworth, Screening and Summary Procedures in the United States Courts of
Appeals, 1973 WAsm U. L.Q. 257.
25
RE.oRT OF = DmcEoR, supra note 1, Table 1, at 1.
26 Id. Table 2, at 44.
27There are 25 judges in the Fifth Circuit. 631 F.2d XIII-XIV (1981) (Table
of Judges).
28 0ral communication from John Hebman, Clerk of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
2 9 
REPORT or THE DmEcorO, supra note 1, Table 1, at 1.
30 Id.
31 The situation in the district courts is comparable. In fiscal year 1940, 34,734
cases were filed. In 1980, the total was 168,789, approximately 4.9 times the 1940
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siders not only the increased volume of litigation, but also the in-
creased complexity of individual cases, 32 there can be no doubt that
the federal judicial system has been pushed almost to the point of
collapse.33
III.
Attempts to deal with the vastly increased volume of litigation
have focused on treating symptoms rather than causes. Efforts have
centered upon speeding up the judicial process, so the increased
caseload can be processed more quickly. Thus, a number of recent
developments in judicial administration have muted the tradition-
ally personal character of the judicial process.
These developments have occurred in a number of related
areas: the number of judges has been increased, policies concern-
ing the publication and content of judicial opinions have been
altered, significant parts of the process of judicial decisionmaking
have been delegated to staff attorneys and law clerks, and oral argu-
ments have been reduced in number, length and importance. All
of these changes may have significant effects upon the traditional
structure of the judicial office. Consequently, they merit a closer
examination, with particular attention to their impact upon the
judicial process as it has evolved.
A common response to the litigation explosion has been to
increase the number of active judges.34 We cannot continue for-
ever to simply add more judges, however, if we intend to maintain
a system of adjudication in which judicial decisions are made by
the individuals who have been chosen to judge. About fifty years
ago, Judge Cuthbert W. Pound of the New York Court of Appeals
said, "[T]he judge should no doubt... be both lawyer and philoso-
pher of the highest grade, blessed with saving common sense and
practical experience as well as sound comprehensive learning, but
total. There were 190 district court judges in 1940. There are now 516. Again,
if it is assumed that the cases were evenly distributed, each of the district judges
in 1940 would have been responsible for about 183 cases, while today each of the
516 judges would be expected to dispose of about 327 cases a year. REPORT OF
TnE DmEcTon, supra note 1, Table 3, at 3.
82 E.g., In re United States Fin. Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702, 712-13 (S.D.
Cal. 1977), re'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1866
(1980); In re Boise Cascade See. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99, 101-03 (W.D.
Wash. 1976).
33The state courts are experiencing comparable congestion. See D. MEADoR,
supra note 2, at 7-9; S. WASBY, et al, VOLUME AND DELAY IN STATE APPFLLATE
COURTS: PoBL_ ms AND RESPONSES 1-40 (1979); SELECTED READINGS: COURT CON-
cESTION AND DELAY (G. Winters ed. 1971).
34 See notes 1, 25, 27 & 30 supra & accompanying texts.
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such men are rare." 35 If such individuals were rare in 1929, they
are no less rare today.36 Yet, as the figures noted earlier make clear,
the need for such people today is unprecedented, and tomorrow no
doubt it will be greater still.
Appointment to the federal bench has historically been deemed
an ultimate ambition by many lawyers.3 7  There have been, how-
ever, indications in recent years that the position of a federal judge
may no longer be perceived as being as attractive as it once was. 8
Many of the most capable lawyers, some of whom might even meet
Judge Pound's description of the ideal, decline to be considered,
while others serve only for a short time before returning to the bar.
Surely, the causes of this phenomenon are numerous and complex.
In particular, the work is hard and the pay is not high.39 I would
suggest, also, that the proliferation of federal judgeships has itself
added to the problem by lowering the status of the position.40
The problems inherent in unlimited judicial expansion are
more serious, however, than perceptions of prestige. When we
choose to solve the caseload problem by adding new judges, new
3 5 Pound, Defective Law-Its Cause and Remedy, 1 BuL_. N.Y. STATE B.A.
279, 285 (1929).
36 Cf. 2 Tnm FE-DERas No. 78, at 106 (A. Hamilton) (Bourne ed. 1921)
("there can be but few men in the society who will have sufficient skill in the
laws to qualify them for the stations of judges").
3 7J. Scmvmim.usEa, JuDGEs AND JusTIcE 41-42 (1979). See generally Volcan-
sek-Clark, Why Lawyers Become Judges, 62 Ju icATurE 166 (1978).
38 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1980, § 1, at 10, col. 3 (statement of Judge
Irving R. Kaufman).39J. RYAN, et al., AmERwcAN TRIAL. JucEs 17-116 (1980); J. Scumnxnu~usEa,
supra note 37, at 123-26, 182-95. For a discussion of increased caseloads, see all
of part H supra. For a discussion of the work load of Supreme Court Justices,
see Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HAav. L. REv. 84 (1959)
(arguing that the Court is trying to decide more cases than it is able to).
Justice Blackmun has remarked that, "I thought I had labored to the limits of
my ability in private practice... and as a judge of the Court of Appeals. Here,
however, the pressure is greater and more constant, and it relents little even during
the summer months." CoaMIssIoN ON REvisiON OF THE FEDERAL CounT APPEL-
LATE SYSTEM, STRucTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDuRES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
CHANcE 184 (1975) [hereinafter cited as INTERNAL PROCEDURES], quoted in J.
ScmnDHAusER, supra note 37.
The issue of judicial salaries has come to the attention of both the courts and
the public. In 1976, a number of federal judges brought suit in the U.S. Court
of Claims seeking an increase in judicial salaries, on the theory that the effects of
inflation had "diminished" their income in violation of Article III, § 1 of the
Constitution. See Hazard, The Judges Want a Raise, THE NATION, Mar. 20, 1976,
at 323; N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1976, § 1, at 1, col. 1. See also United States v. Will,
100 S. Ct. 1010 (1980).
40Accord, H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURIsDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 22-30
(1973) ("inflation of the number of district judges .. .will result by its own
Gresham's law, in a depreciation of the judicial currency and the consequent
impairment of the prestige and of the efficiency of the federal courts."). See also
W. Krrcmm, FEDERAL DISTRICT JuDGEs: AN ANALYSIS OF JuniCrAL PERcEPTIoNs
(1978); J. RYAN, supra note 39, at 121-67.
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problems are created for the administration of justice, as recently
occurred in the Fifth Circuit. After years of steady growth both
in caseload and in the number of authorized judgeships, that court
now has twenty-five active judges, fifteen of whom have been ap-
pointed since October 1977. 41 The judges of the Fifth Circuit sat
en banc in January 1980. After that experience, they voted unani-
mously to support legislation splitting the circuit. 42  As the Fifth
Circuit judges themselves recognized, the expansion of a court can
create intrinsic difficulties that are among the most serious of those
generated by the increased caseload that originally created the need
for additional judges. There is a loss of collegiality, a greater like-
lihood of intra-circuit conflicts, and an almost self-defeating cum-
bersomeness in the en banc hearings that are intended to permit
resolution of those conflicts.
The Fifth Circuit was recently split. The Ninth Circuit
should probably be split as well.43 But that course is not one that
41631 F.2d XIII-XIV (1981) (Table of Judges).
42 The judges unanimously joined in a petition to Congress urging that their
circuit be split See H.R. REPr. No. 1390, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in
[1980] U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws 7680, 7685.
43 The splitting of both circuits was recommended in 1973 by the Commission
on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System. In its report, The Geographic
Boundaries of the Several Judicial Circuits: Alternative Proposals, 62 F.R.D. 223
(1973), the Commission stated, "We have concluded that the creation of two new
circuits is essential to afford immediate relief to the Fifth and Ninth Circuits." Id.
228. Compelling current support for the Commission's proposal is found in the
1980 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts. The statistics contained in this report reinforce the view that the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits are the nation's most overworked courts. For the twelve
month period ending June 30, 1980, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits led all other
circuits by a wide margin in terms of the numbers of appeals commenced, cases
terminated, and cases pending. The Fifth Circuit had 4,225 cases commenced,
3,810 cases terminated, and 4,273 cases pending. The Ninth Circuit had, respec-
tively, 3,738, 3,177, and 4,618 cases in these categories. The nearest circuit to
these two in numbers of appeals commenced was the Second with 2,171. In num-
bers of dispositions, the nearest was the Fourth, with 2,242. Finally, the closest
on the basis of cases pending was the Sixth, with 2,366. REPoRT OF THE DmEcToa,
supra note 1, Table 2, at 44.
The problem of the Fifth Circuit has recently been resolved by Congress. On
October 14, 1980, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. 41), was passed,
dividing the Fifth Circuit into two autonomous circuits. The new Fifth Circuit
contains the District of the Canal Zone, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. The
'Eleventh Circuie' is composed of Alabama, Florida, and Georgia.
Legislation dividing the Ninth Circuit has been proposed, see, e.g., S. 2988,
93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REc. 2609 (1974), but it has not met with similar
success. One commentator has stated that this is due in part to the opposition of
the organized bar in California to any reorganization of the Ninth Circuit. See
Hellman, Central Staff in Appellate Courts: The Experience of the Ninth Circuit,
68 CALIF. L. REv. 937, 941 n.24 (1980) (quoting Circuit Realignment: Hearings on
S. 729 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate
Judiciary Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 2, at 162-68 (1975) (statement of
Brent Abel)).
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can be pursued for long as a general solution to the problems that
face our courts. There is a limit to the number of circuits that
we can have without diminishing the desirable multi-state character
of the courts of appeals. 44 The character of the circuit courts would
surely change if every populous or litigious state were to become a
single circuit. Moreover, there is a limit to the number of circuits
that can exist if the essential uniformity of federal law is to be
preserved.45  It is not unusual for years to elapse before the Su-
preme Court resolves conflicts among the existing eleven circuits.
46
The Court could not hope to resolve all important circuit conflicts
if the number of circuits were significantly increased. Accordingly,
as circuits would become more localized and parochial, they also
would become more certainly courts of last resort.
47
A second response to heavier caseloads has been to provide
judges with more law clerks 48 or to delegate judicial responsibility
to staff attorneys.40 Law clerks have been a part of the American
judicial process for nearly a century.50 Originally intended as cleri-
44 Professor Wright has stated that:
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the regional character of the
courts of appeals . . . [State courts] are state-oriented not nationally-
oriented. This is precisely the quality which the federal courts of appeals
must avoid. They must apply a national system of law in such fashion as
will best serve the national interest. They are best able to do that when
they are composed of judges who have practiced in different states, who
have a wide variety of experience, who are free from the prejudices and
provincialisms which color the thinking of lawyers in any one state.
Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in judicial Administration, 42 TEx.
L. REv. 949, 974 (1964). See also The Geographical Boundaries of the Several
Judicial Circuits: Alternative Proposals, 62 F.R.D. 223, 227 (1973); INTmtAL
PRoc nER s, supra note 39, at 59-60.
4 5 Speaking before the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate
System, Professor Alan N. Polasky remarked that increasing the number of circuits
simply enhances the possibility that you will have increased conflicts be-
tween circuits, and what I think others refer to as balkanization of national
law... Unless there is somehow or other an opportunity to resolve these
decisions ... between the circuits, you get an increase in disharmony ...
[Y]ou must assure the people in this country that the law that is being
applied, for example, in Vanderbilt, Michigan, or Philadelphia, Pennsyl-
vania, or in New York, is the same law ... [Y]ou have to have confidence
that the people are being treated equally ... And it seems to me that is
one of the key issues for emphasizing national law.
2 Hearings Before the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate
System (2d Phase) 787 (1975).
46See INrmwAL PRocEDUREs, supra note 39, at 3, 16-19.
471d.
485See note 2 supra & authorities cited in note 50 infra.
49 See Ubell, Report on Central Staff Attorneys' Offices in the United States
Courts of Appeals, 87 F.R.D. 253 (1980).
50 For concise histories of the use of law clerks, see Baier, The Law Clerks:
Profile of an Institution, 26 VAND. L. REv. 1125 (1973); Newland, Personal Assist-
ants to Supreme Court justices: The Law Clerks, 40 On. L. REV. 299 (1961);
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cal assistants,51 law clerks have assumed ever-increasing responsibili-
ties. 5 2 Until only recently, federal judges had only one law clerk,63
and the relationship between judge and clerk was particularly
close.5 4 Professor Kurland described the relationship well in a
tribute to Judge Frank, for whom he clerked in 1944-45:
You criticized his draft opinions and memoranda as
vigorously as he had challenged yours. And each of you
put the offerings of the other judges through the wringer,
no matter how exalted the writer of the opinion. Thus
the law clerk, barely out of law school, was encouraged by
Frank to say why and where Judge Learned Hand, the
dean of the federal judiciary, had erred. It was Frank who
had been appointed to the court by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate and so it was he who had
the last word. But short of that point egalitarianism pre-
vailed. 5
Kurland's description of his clerkship conveys the sense of an
atmosphere charged with intellectual energy. Although experi-
ences no doubt varied from judge to judge, 56 the clerk's principal
non-clerical task had become the critiquing of judicial opinions and
arguments.57 For the clerk, it was a unique educational experi-
ence.r8 For the law, it was a process in which reasons and results
were thoroughly challenged. Importantly, however, the arrange-
Wright, Observations of an Appellate judge: The Use of Law Clerks, 26 VND. L.
REv. 1179 (1973). The first official action taken towards securing clerical assistance
for Supreme Court Justices was a report in 1885 by Attorney General Garland.
Garland recommended that each Justice be provided with "a secretary or law clerk,
to be a stenographer," who would "assist in such clerical work as might be assigned
to him." 1885 Ar'y GEq. REP. 43, quoted in Newland, supra, at 301.
51 See note 50 supra.52 Baler, supra note 50, at 1128-37; Newland, supra note 50, at 300-05.
5a Justice Harlan Stone, upon becoming Chief Justice in 1941, initiated the use
of two law clerks, largely to cope with an increased Supreme Court caseload.
Newland, supra note 50, at 303-04. See note 2 supra.
54A number of former law clerks have described their experiences in glowing
terms. E.g., Brudney & Wolfson, Mr. Justice Rutledge-Law Clerks' Reflections,
25 IND. L.J. 455 (1950); Kurland, Jerome N. Frank: Some Reflections and Recol-
lections of a Law Clerk, 24 U. Cm. L. REv. 661 (1957); Meador, Justice Black and
His Law Clerks, 15 ALA . L. Rtv. 57 (1962); Nesson, Mr. Justice Harlan, 85 HARV.
L. REv. 390 (1971).
55 Kurland, supra note 54, at 663.
56 Newland, supra note 50, at 311 ("their duties have been determined entirely
by their individual justices").
57 K. LLEwELLYN, supra note 7, at 322; Baler, supra note 50, at 296 ("a valu-
able sounding board"); Kurland, supra note 54, at 663; Newland, supra note 50,
at 314; Meador, supra note 54, at 59-60.
58 See K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 7, at 321-23; Baler, supra note 50, at 1161-63;
Braden, The Value of Law Clerks, 24 Miss. L.J. 295, 298 (1953); Wright, supra
note 50, at 1194-96.
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ment focused on testing the judge's work, and not on substituting
the clerk's efforts for it.
When I first became a judge, we were still operating with one
clerk. Later, we had two. While I never served under the present
system of three clerks, 59 I am not sure that I could really use three
clerks and still believe that I was the one, as Professor Kurland
puts it, "who had the last word." In any event, it seems to me
undesirable that we move beyond three clerks. There are inherent
limits to the amount and types of work that can safely be delegated
to clerks.60 Perhaps of greater importance, there are limits to the
amount of time and energy that any one person can be expected to
devote to the supervision of even the brightest of law clerks. It
is not enough that the judge be sufficiently satisfied with the clerk's
work that he is willing to sign it. The judge must make the critical
decisions in the analysis and the execution of the work. Clerks
are certainly helpful in relieving judges of some of the burden,
but it is the judge who was appointed to weigh the issues in every
case, and there are limits to the number of cases he can personally
judge. Finally, the increase in the number of clerks may sig-
nificantly alter the role of the clerk. Rather than critiquing and
testing judicial work, clerks may come to perform this work them-
selves. All of these considerations raise doubts in my mind as to
the wisdom of further increasing the role of law clerks in the ju-
dicial process.
A development that I regard with even greater concern, how-
ever, is the growth-I might say cancerous growth-of central staff
attorneys' offices. 61 As of a year ago, there were 136 persons em-
ployed as staff attorneys in the federal courts. 62 Central staff at-
torneys perform a variety of functions, including several that are
grounds for some concern. 63 They make initial recommendations
59 See note 2 supra.
60 For similar misgivings regarding over-delegation of judicial duties, see Baier,
supra note 50, at 1163-71; Newland, supra note 50, at 315-16; Rehnquist, Who
Writes Decisions of the Supreme Court?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 13,
1957, at 74.
01 Arthur D. Hellman, writing on the experience of the Ninth Circuit, remarks
that, "Initially the staff had only one full-time attorney, who was assisted by elbow
clerks assigned . . . for periods of six to eight weeks. By 1974 there were seven
attorneys on the central staff, and in 1976 the number was increased to twenty."
Hellman, supra note 43, at 943. The increase in the use of staff attorneys-and
the reasons for this increase-is also discussed in D. MEAon, supra note 2, at 7-18.
62 REPoRT OF THE DmECTOR, supra note 1, Table 19, at 19. The 136 attorneys
include: 11 Senior Staff Attorneys, 8 Supervisory Staff Attorneys, and 117 Staff
Attorneys.
63 The central staff attorneys have been given responsibility over many tasks
that were originally the province of the judges assigned to the case. First, the
1981]
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whether cases warrant oral argument and how they should be de-
cided.64 In some cases for which they deem oral argument unneces-
sary, they prepare draft opinions for consideration by a panel of
judges. 65 These arrangements, while contributing generally to the
development of a more bureaucratic judicial process, 66 are at odds
in several specific respects with traditional notions of the judicial
office. As pointed out earlier, we have long expected that the judge
"will do his own work," and that he will be directly involved in the
decisionmaking process. Similarly, we have expected that judges
hear whatever claims are brought before them. The widespread
use of staff attorneys creates the possibility that these expectations
will not be realized.
While I have no statistics to support my conjecture, I would
not be surprised if the press of business might tempt some judges
to give the briefs in cases deemed unworthy of judicial attention a
cursory look at best. Indeed, I have seen many opinions in the
last few years that contain substantial internal evidence of cursory
central staff has the job of "screening" cases when they are initially filed with the
appellate court. The screening staff, according to Judge Hufstedler,
acquires a case at the moment the notice of appeal is filed, shepherds it
through each procedural step until the closing brief is in, prepares legal
memoranda, drafts a proposed opinion or other disposition, recommends
grant or denial of oral argument, and presents the complete package to
the judges to be graded pass/fail.
Hufstedler, The Appellate Process Inside Out, 50 CAL. ST. B.J. 20, 22 (1975).
See Hehman, Judicial Administration in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit: Organization and Procedures to Address the Volume Crisis, 10 U.
ToL. L. REv. 645, 655 (1979) (similar analysis of central staff screening functions
in the Sixth Circuit).
Hellman refers to a process within Hufstedler's screening phase that he terms
"inventory." Hellman, supra note 43, at 944. This process requires the staff
attorneys and law clerks to read the case's records and briefs, and to prepare
"inventory cards" that contain information that assists the court in preparing its
arguments calendar. Id. Most importantly, the attorneys will assign a given case
a particular "weight," or "a numerical estimate of the relative difficulty of the
case from the judges' standpoint. The weights are used to equalize the workloads
assigned to the various panels sitting in any given month." Id.
Once a case has been placed on the court's calendar, it will be assigned to a
three-judge panel. The court's staff law clerks will be responsible for preparing
bench memoranda on the cases scheduled for argument, and the judge assigned to
write the opinion of the court may request staff attorney assistance in the drafting
of opinions in cases that the law clerks have not previously handled. Id. 945. A
detailed description of staff attorney functions can be found in D. MEADOR, supra
note 2, at 31-76; INaRAL PocEanuRs, supra note 39, at 53-54.
64 D. MEAon, supra note 2, at 31-40 & 48-53.
65 Id. 48-53.
66 As the judicial process becomes more bureaucratic, it becomes more likely
that internal political pressures and inertia will control the decisionmaking process.
M. CaozmR, THE BuREAucBaTic PHENOMENON 187-98 (1964); J. F mnmAx, ClISIs
AND LEGrr AcY (1979).
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judicial examination.67  It is not at all rare to see unpublished,
per curiam opinions containing obvious logical-and even gram-
matical-flaws, 8 all carried beneath the names of three judges
whose published opinions generally demonstrate clear thinking and
precise writing. One explanation of this phenomenon is that such
opinions are not authored in chambers and receive only the most
fleeting consideration when they reach the judge's desk. This
phenomenon gives substance to fears that the use of staff attorneys
will alter our traditional expectation that judges hear whoever
comes before their court.0 9 More obvious, perhaps, is the stark
contrast between poorly reasoned and written opinions and our
fundamental expectation that judicial decisions will be accompanied
by reasoned justifications.70
Delegation of some aspects of the judge's work is essential,
as is no doubt true of much of the work of many other public
officials. Such delegation appears particularly desirable against the
background of overloaded dockets.7 1 But we must not lose sight of
the fundamental changes in the nature of the judicial enterprise
that may accompany delegation of too many or too critical aspects
of the judge's work.
On one level, excessive delegation results in a product shaped
by people other than the men and women chosen because of their
"wisdom, uprightness, and learning." We might well repose con-
siderably less "trust and confidence" in a group of faceless assistants
than we do in the appointed judge. On another level, excessive
delegation poses a threat to the traditional institutional structure
of the judicial office. We can no longer count on receiving the
personal attention of a judge who is insulated by layers of staff.
67 For a thorough empirical study examining, inter alia, the correlation between
nonpublication and low quality of opinions, see Reynolds & Richman, supra note 5;
Reynolds & Richman, Limited Publication in the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, 1979
DU=E L.J. 807. See also Wold, Going Through the Motions: The Monotony of
Appellate Court Decisionmaking, 62 JuDICATuBE 58, 63 (1978) (quoting California
appellate judge: "In the unpublished, there is just no room for creativeness or in-
novation."); Remarks of John P. Frank, Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference (July
29, 1976), cited in Reynolds & Richman, supra note 5.
68 See cases noted in Reynolds & Richman, supra note 5. See also Wold,
supra note 67, at 63 (quoting California appellate judge: "We've got too much to
•do to fool around with something like that [checking accuracy of citations and
quotations] in an unpublished opinion.").
69 For a similar argument, suggesting that the federal appellate courts may be
-becoming "certiorari" courts, see Reynolds & Richman, supra note 5.
70 See text accompanying notes 18-22 supra.
71 For a favorable opinion of judicial delegation, see Codbold, Improvements
in Appellate Procedure: Better Use of Available Facilities, 66 A.B.A.J. 863 (1980).
,Significantly, Judge Godbold will be the Chief Judge of the new Eleventh Circuit.
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Elimination of time-consuming oral argument and considered
opinions in cases deemed meritless is another of the palliatives in-
creasingly used to reduce the burden of the caseload.7 2 For ex-
ample, during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1980, the Fifth Cir-
cuit disposed of 1,078 cases without oral argument.73 About one-
third of those cases were disposed of in "opinions" that said simply:
"AFFIRMED. See Local Rule 21," or "ENFORCED. See Local
Rule 21." 74 Such summary justice may be necessary in our society
today. But in my judgment it is efficiency achieved at too great a
cost. My experience as a judge of the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals leads me to believe that oral argument, although sometimes
fruitless, is often useful for both the bench and bar.75 Points not
clearly made in briefs can often be forcefully made in oral argu-
ment, or at least adequately explained as a result of persistent
questioning. Cases that clearly seem to be "predestined . . . to
affirmance without opinion," to use Cardozo's phrase,76 sometimes
seem less predestined after oral argument. Oral argument is the
most visible, and often the most effective, form of "dialogue" be-
tween judge and litigant. Curtailment of this type of exchange
further alters our perception of the judicial office as a personal one.
Little need be said about the desirability of opinions. All of
us have had seemingly brilliant ideas that turned out to be much
less so when we attempted to put them to paper.77 Every conscien-
72 See FED. R. APP. P. 34; INTERNAL PROCEDuREs, supra note 39, at 46-49;
authorities cited in Hearings Before the Commission on the Revision of the Federal
Court System (1st Phase) 64-70 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Revision Hearings
(1st Phase)]. The number of cases terminated without oral argument or sub-
mission on briefs increased as a percent of total terminations from 33.5% in 1979
to 36.3% in 1980. REPORT OF TRE DIRECTOR, supra note 1, at 51.
7 3 REPORT OF TH DIRECTOR, supra note 1, Table B-1, at A-3.
74 See id. Table 9, at 51.
Several circuits decide substantial numbers of cases stating only "Affirmed.
See Local Rule x." or using a standard recitation, tracking the language of the
local rule. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 5.
75 See K. LLEw.ELLY-N, supra note 7, at 240 ("In any but freak situations, oral
argument is a must.") (footnote omitted); authorities quoted in INTERNAL Pno-
cEnuREs, supra note 39, at 46-49; Hearings Before the Commission on Revision of
the Federal Court System (2d Phase) 64 (written statement of Orison Harden),
449 (testimony of Edward Hickey) (1974-75) [hereinafter cited as Revision
Hearings (2d Phase)]; Segal Remarks, supra note 22.
76 B. Crmmozo, supra note 7, at 164.
77 A number of commentators have discusied the costs and benefits of the
limited publication of judicial opinions. E.g., P. CARR1NGTON, et al., JusTicE oN-
APPEAL (1976); Revision Hearings (2d Phase), supra note 75; Chanin, A Survey
of the Writing and Publication of Opinions in Federal and State Appellate Courts,
67 LAw LiB. J. 362 (1974); Newber & Wilson, Rule 21: Unprecedents and the
Disappearing Court, 32 Aim. L. REv. 37 (1978); Note, Unreported Decisions in
the United States Court of Appeals, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 128 (1977).
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tious judge has struggled, and finally changed his mind, when con-
fronted with the "opinion that won't write." 7s We can only guess
.at the number of decisions "affirmed without opinion" that might
have been reversed had a judge attempted to write an opinion ex-
plaining the announced result. Moreover, a five- or ten-word opin-
ion provides neither the litigants nor the rest of us with the rea-
soned analysis central to the judge's enterprise. 79 This development,
together with the use of staff attorneys to screen cases, the reduc-
tions in oral arguments, and the increasing delegation of responsi-
bilities to law clerks, seems to strike close to the heart of traditional
notions of the judicial process. These changes subtly alter what I
have termed the "personal" character of the judicial office.8 0 Judges
may no longer hear every case, but only the important ones. They
may no longer engage in genuine dialogue with litigants nor be
expected to give reasons for the decisions they announce. These
,changes ultimately may prove unimportant. In light of the tradi-
tional importance of the personal character of the judicial office,
however, a miscalculation might prove costly. I recognize that
there is room for considerable difference of opinion on this issue.
My point is simply that these are costs that must be weighed against
the benefits of the changes in the federal courts system.
IV.
Lest my uneasiness be thought the mere speculations of a cur-
mudgeon, a judge turned lawyer, let me briefly describe the experi-
ence of one state appellate court, which may serve, if not to reveal
the difficulties that are present in the federal courts today, at least
to highlight the difficulties that await the federal court system. In
a recent article, political scientist John Wold reported on his study
of the California Court of Appeal.81 Professor Wold and a col-
league interviewed forty-one of the fifty-six judges of the California
Court of Appeal, the state's intermediate court, which sits in thir-
teen divisions in five districts.82 The court, like many others, has
78 See Helman, supra note 43, at 939. Compare K. LLwErLLrx, supra note 7,
.at 101-06; J. Fumu, supra note 7, at 100 ("Judging begins rather the other way
around-with a conclusion more or less vaguely formed; a man ordinarily starts
with such a conclusion and afterwards tries to find premises which will substantiate
it. If he cannot, to his satisfaction, find proper arguments to link up his con-
elusion with premises which he finds acceptable, he will, unless he is arbitrary or
mad, reject the conclusion and seek another.").
79 See notes 19-21 supra & accompanying text.
80 See text following note 22 supra.
81 Wold, supra note 67.
82 Id. 59-61.
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experienced an explosive increase in litigation. In fiscal year 1976,
10,797 cases were filed-approximately 570 cases per panel.8 3 The
candor with which the judges discussed their work is commendable;
what they had to say is frightening. For instance, one judge re-
marked, "We have chances for creativity a couple of times a year,
maybe. But we're too busy to think that much. We give each
case full consideration, but this is essentially an assembly line." 8
Apparently, the only way that the system works at all is through
a procedure whereby incoming cases are screened by permanent
central staff attorneys who weed out appeals that they consider non-
meritorious8 5 The staff then prepares memorandum opinions in
those cases. As Professor Wold said in his article: "The staff prod-
uct does not become the decision of the court until the judges them-
selves adopt it. But judicial adoption, perhaps with minor modifi-
cations, is typically perfunctory, and the memoranda are eventually
handed down as 'By-the-Court' opinions." 86 Significantly, some
judges complained that not enough cases were delegated to the
staff.8
7
With respect to the opinions that they wrote, the judges noted
that they did not receive credit under the court's "unofficial quota
system" for writing separate concurrences or dissents, thereby cre-
ating an institutional bias in favor of unanimous decisions even in
concededly difficult cases. 8 With disarming candor, one judge
said, "I hate to say this, but just the workload alone may encourage
one judge to agree with the others, because otherwise he or she
would have to write a dissenting opinion." 89 The judges also noted
that a callousness had developed out of boredom,90 and that "they
constantly had to remind themselves that all cases deserved their
close scrutiny, since appeals sometimes proved to be much more
deserving of attention than they appeared at first glance." o-
83 Id. 61.
84 Id. 62.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. Although only a few judges voiced this opinion, one commented that the
staff "should be doing hard work." Id.
88 Id. 64. "Dissents were filed in an average of only 1.6 per cent of all matters
disposed of by majority opinion during fiscal years 1971-1973 .... ." Id. n.19.
89 Id. 64. The presiding judge in one division reportedly said, "My job here
is to get rid of the garbage, because I can get rid of it faster than anybody
else." Id.
For discussion of the value of dissenting and concurring opinions, see authorities
cited note 17 supra.
90 Wold, supra note 67, at 65.
91 Id. Compare "As with everything in life, three-fourths of what you do is
routine and pretty dull, whether you're selling life insurance or deciding judicial
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I would venture to guess that the situation that is developing
in the federal courts of appeals is not different in kind from that
which is portrayed in Professor Wold's study. The remedies with
which we are experimenting in the federal courts have been tested
in California, and they have clearly failed to solve the problem.
The system of churning out staff-generated per curiam opinions in
the intermediate appellate court was recently described by Chief
Justice Bird of the California Supreme Court as "turning our appel-
late justices into administrators processing paper in a large bureau-
cracy, rather than judges writing opinions." 92
In the eyes of a number of observers, the changes in judicial
administration adopted in California have altered the character of
the judicial office. It is difficult, if not impossible, to square the
image of "administrators processing paper in a large bureaucracy"
with the traditional view of judging as a "personal" business center-
ing on dialogue and reasoned analysis. To return to Justice Bran-
deis for a moment, can the judges who hand down these per curiam
opinions say that they "do their own work"? And if they cannot,
will they continue to command our respect?
V.
In the federal system, however, we have the basis for a solution
-at least a partial solution-that is not available to the states. Quite
simply, the federal courts are-and ought to be-courts of limited
jurisdiction. 93 For the most part, the scope of that jurisdiction
is determined by Congress, which need not, of course, assign all
the problems of our society for solution to the federal courts.94
Congress might take a hard look at where the bulk of the federal
caseload comes from and determine where, given limitations of
judicial time, the jurisdiction of the federal courts can best be cut
back. The protracted and continuing debate over diversity juris-
diction, however, does not suggest that this solution will be speedily
opinions or driving a streetcar," id. (quoting California Court of Appeal judge) with
"[T]he good judge is an artist, perhaps most like a chef. Into the composition of
his dishes he adds so much of this or that element .... The test of his success
is the measure in which his craftsman's skill meets with general acceptance."
Hand, Book Review, 35 HAnv. L. BEv. 479 (1922).
92 Bird, The Hidden Judiciary, 17 No. 1 JuDes' J. 5-6 (1978).
93C. WiGiHT, HANDBOOx OF THE LAW OF FEDEmAL CourTs § 7 (1976).
94 See id. § 10; see also Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower
Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974); Redish & Woods, Congres-
sional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review
and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 46-47 (1975).
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or easily implemented.95 In any event, such suggestions simply
shift the burden to the state judicial systems, which if California
is representative, are also staggering under the weight of their case-
loads. 96
The plight of the federal courts has been repeatedly brought
to the attention of the legislative branch in recent years.97 Con-
gress has demonstrated considerable sensitivity to the situation of
the judiciary, and several reform efforts have been undertaken.9"
As I have suggested, however, many of these reforms are directed
at the symptoms and not the causes of the crisis.99 Moreover, some
of these developments run directly counter to traditional notions of
the judicial office.100
I suggest that consideration be given to addressing the dilemma
of the federal courts on a more fundamental level. Congress, in
recent years, has legislated in more and more areas that once were
considered the province of the states. :0 In addition, legislation
has been drafted in increasingly general terms. 02 Such generality,
of course, creates numerous appeals on issues of legislative intent,
-complex appeals in which there are no easy answers. Similarly,
courts now frequently are called upon to make quasi-legislative
decisions, filling in ever-increasing gaps in statutory law. These
decisions, requiring consideration of a wide variety of facts and
9 5 E.g., Lumbermen's Mut. Gas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 53 (1954) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) (opposing diversity jurisdiction); H. FIIENDLY, supra note
40, at 3-4, 139-52 (urging abolition of diversity cases except in limited circum-
stances); Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YALE L.J. 7 (1963);
Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms in Administration of Justice in Federal Courts,
8 A.B.A.J. 601, 604 (1922).
9 6 See note 33 supra.
9
T E.g., Revision Hearings (1st & 2d Phases), supra notes 72 & 75.
9 8 See, e.g., An Act to Improve Judicial Machinery, Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90
Stat. 1119 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Equal Access to
Justice Act, H.R. R P. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sss. (1980); Federal Courts
Improvements Act of 1979, S. 677 & S. 678, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); National
Court of Appeals Act, S. 2762 & S. 3423, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Circuit
Court Judgeship Bill, S. 2991, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
99 See all of part III supra.
10l Id.
101 Judge Friendly has pointed to the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.),
the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-224, tit. I, 84 Stat. 91 (codified in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.), the
Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-340, 86 Stat. 424 (codified
in scattered sections of 33, 46 U.S.C.), and the Noise Control Act of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234 (codified in scattered sections of 42, 49 U.S.C.), as
examples of such "new" legislation. H. FBIENDLY, supra note 40, at 22-27.
10 2 See H. FRIENDLY, BENcm nns 47-48 (1967).
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policy, 03 are equally difficult for courts to resolve. 1°04 Such cases,
of course, take time, an undeniably scarce resource in our courts.
Congress, of course, could not legislate so as to avoid the neces-
sity for statutory construction. 05  It could, however, do a better
job than it does. One need only call to mind the amount of ink
and the amount of judicial time that has been spent in recent years
.on the question whether Congress has created, sub silentio, a pri-
vate cause of action under various federal statutes. 06  Congress
.assuredly cannot eliminate all questions that will arise under the
statutes that it enacts, even with respect to remedial provisions,
-but fundamental questions, such as whether private parties have
the right to bring suit under a statute, are certainly ones that
Congress can be expected to answer.
Although legislative actions clearly contributed to the litiga-
tion explosion, the federal courts also have had a hand in the de-
velopment of the crisis. The courts have not been at all reluctant to
make legislative-type decisions.'07 Thus, Justice Powell, dissenting in
Cannon v. University of Chicago,08 linked a "flood of lower-court
decisions" to an imprecise and overly lenient standard for implying
a private cause of action under federal statutes.1°9 Justice Powell
103 Professor Davis has asserted that Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976), involved questions of science and policy
"so difficult as to be in an absolute sense beyond human understanding." 2
K. DAvis, ArnnrsmATTvz LAw TAATrss § 10.3, at 316 (1979).
104 The more rigorous time requirements facing a federal judge were recently
discussed by Judge Friendly:
The new business of the federal courts is much more taxing than the old
business was. A single school desegregation case can occupy a district
judge for years.... Similar remarks could be made in regard to suits con-
cerning the conditions of prisoners and mental hospitals, where federal
courts have felt obliged to work out detailed codes affecting nearly every
aspect of operation. . . .The handling of actions such as I have been
describing is no more like that of the ordinary law suit than the operation
of the Queen Elizabeth Il is like paddling a canoe.
Federal Courts Improvements Act of 1979: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Im-
provements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 171-72 (1979) (statement of Henry J. Friendly).
105 Cf. "A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of
a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circum-
stances and the time in which it is used." Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425
(1917) (Holmes, J.).
106 See cases cited in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730
(1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
107E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541
F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). See also cases cited in Fiss,
supra note 14, at 12 n.28, 17 n.35 (concerning reformation of Arkansas prison
system and Coney Island school).
108 441 U.S. at 730 (Powell, J., dissenting).
109 Id. 741-42.
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charged the judiciary with "assum[ing] the legislative role[s]" of
creating civil remedies and defining their own jurisdiction."" Al-
though the courts frequently, and properly, make "legislative" de-
cisions,' Justice Powell's criticism is persuasive. At some point,
judicial "lawmaking" goes too far."12 As Justice Powell reasoned
in Cannon, "respect for our constitutional system dictates that the
issue should have been resolved by the elected representatives in
Congress after public hearings, debate, and legislative decision." 113-
He concluded that the issue was not "properly to be decided by
relatively uninformed federal judges who are isolated from the po-
litical process." 114 A number of commentators have recognized,
as Justice Powell did, the inherent limitations that the judiciary
faces when it attempts to make this type of legislative decision. 115
The willingness of the federal courts to assume increased "legisla-
tive" responsibilities has no doubt contributed to the current case-
load crisis. Many, perhaps all, of the judiciary's activities in this
area are important and probably desirable. Yet they have been
accompanied by significant costs: attempts to cope with increased
responsibilities have resulted in our courts becoming increasingly
bureaucratic. So drastic an alteration in the judicial office as tradi-
tionally conceived ought to be undertaken only after careful con-
l Id. 730-31.
"I'The classic view was that the judge legislates interstitially, filling in gaps
left in statutory schemes. Justice Holmes wrote, "judges do and must legislate, but
they can do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions."
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917). See B. CARDozo, supra
note 7, at 68-70, 113-14 ("He legislates only between gaps."). The recent trend
has been to recognize a more expansive judicial lawmaking role. E.g., Fiss, supra
note 14, passim.
112 Professor Fuller, exploring the limits of the adjudicatory process, has pointed
out the difficulties that are encountered when "polycentrie" problems are dealt with
through the judicial process. Fuller, supra note 16, at 394-405. Fuller, recognizing
that "[t]here are polycentric elements in almost all problems submitted to adjudica-
tion," argued that certain problems involve so many interrelated tensions that they
are "beyond the proper limits of adjudication." Id. 395, 397. Fullers reasoning
supports justice Powell's conclusion that the courts have involved themselves too
deeply in nonadjudicative activities. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 730-31. See also Eisen-
berg, supra note 18, at 431-32 ("A proper appreciation of the forms and limits of
adjudication turns in large part on determining the point at which... the process
becomes unequal to the task because the nature of the problem demands more
diffuse forms of responsiveness and participation than adjudication can legitimately
provide.").
For a broader view of the capabilities of the judicial process, which also
recognizes the limits of the adjudicatory process, see Fiss, supra note 14.
11a Cannon, 441 U.S. at 731.
114 Id.
115 Authorities cited supra note 112. But see 2 K. DAVIs, supra note 103, at
§ 10.3, at 316 (recognizing that Fullers theories are valid, but arguing that they
are appropriate only with respect to trials).
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sideration.'n8 In responding to the litigation explosion, attention
should be given to the causes of the crisis. A more serious evalua-
tion of what proposed legislation will require of the courts might
well ease existing caseloads. Similarly, the judiciary itself might
consider more closely what its decisions will require of future judges.
Although these suggestions are quite broad, I hope that they rep-
resent a first step towards coping with the litigation explosion with-
out fundamentally altering the judicial process. It is clear that if
the federal judicial system is to work in a way that is faithful to
the ends for which it exists, something must be done. Only thus
can we assure that the federal courts will remain effectively avail-
able to vindicate constitutional and important federal statutory
rights.
A great judge of the Second Circuit, Charles M. Hough, once
wrote that "the legal mind must assign some reason in order to
decide anything with spiritual quiet." 117 It is incumbent upon
all of us to do our utmost to restore the conditions necessary for
our appellate courts to dispatch their constitutional obligations
with "spiritual quiet," as well as with efficiency.
I am an alumnus of a state court system and of the federal
courts, and because I have great respect for our judicial institutions,
I hope that I have not sounded a discordant note. The Scriptures
ask, "For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall pre-
pare himself to the battle?" 118 1 trust that I have sounded an
appropriate alarm and that those of us who would preserve our
precious and imperilled courts as effective institutions will give
heed and respond.
116 Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 430 ("adjudication has a moral force and
this force is in major part a function of those elements that distinguish adjudication
from all other forms of ordering. In the long run, the cost of departing from these
elements may be a forfeiture of the moral force of the judicial role."); Fiss, supra
note 14, at 16 ("[The adjudicatory] process is a limitation on [the judge's] legiti-
macy ....").
117 United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222
F. 1006, 1008 (2d Cir. 1915).
1181 Corinthians 14:8.
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